Jonathan Turley, legal analyst and professor of law at George Washington University, says that while he joins those who celebrate the legalization of same-sex marriage in all fifty states, he is not so enthused about the new "right to dignity" invented by Justice Anthony Kennedy and the four left-leaning Supreme Court justices.

In a recent op-ed published in the Washington Post, Turley explained the potential "trouble" stirred up by the majority opinion's declaration of an individual's right to dignity. One of the most obvious problems, Turley argues, is that dignity is a rather "malleable concept" that could be applied to all kinds of cases, including, as many have noted, "polyamorous" relationships:

Dignity is a rather elusive and malleable concept compared with more concrete qualities such as race and sex. Which relationships are sufficiently dignified to warrant protection? What about couples who do not wish to marry but cohabitate? What about polyamorous families, who are less accepted by public opinion but are perhaps no less exemplary when it comes to, in Kennedy’s words on marriage, “the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family”? The justice does not specify. It certainly appears as if Obergefell extends this protection because same-sex unions are now deemed acceptable by the majority. The courts may not be so readily inclined to find that other loving relationships are, to quote the opinion, a “keystone of the Nation’s social order” when they take less-orthodox forms. But popularity hardly seems like a proper legal guide to whether a relationship is dignified.

And how does this "right to dignity" apply (or not) to deeply held religious beliefs?

With the emergence of this new right, we must now determine how it is balanced against other rights and how far it extends. For example, it is clearly undignified for a gay couple to be denied a wedding cake with a homosexual theme. Yet for a Christian or Muslim baker, it might also feel undignified to be forced to prepare an image celebrating same-sex marriage. Should the right to dignity trump free speech or free exercise?

And what about the ruling's assertion of an individual's right to "define and express their identity"?

Other groups outside the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community could invoke this precedent, since the reasoning does not concern a protected sexual-orientation class but rather a citizen’s right to dignity. Could employees challenge workplace dress codes as intruding upon their right to “define and express their identity”? Could those subject to college admissions preferences raise claims that race or gender classifications deny their individual effort to “define and express their identity”? Kennedy’s approach has only deepened the uncertainty over how courts will handle such cases.

Perhaps most troubling, Turley suggests, is how the newly forged "right to dignity" applies to the freedom of speech:

Some of the greatest attacks on dignity are often found in the exercise of free speech. Europe and Canada, for example, protect broader dignity rights through laws that penalize statements deemed degrading, hateful or insulting to different groups, including homosexuals. In Britain, for example, a Baptist street preacher was charged with causing “harassment, alarm or distress” by stating on a street corner that he viewed homosexuality to be a sin. In Canada, comedian Guy Earle was found guilty of violating the human rights of a lesbian couple after he got into a trash-talking exchange during an open-mike night at a nightclub. In France, comedian Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala has been arrested and prosecuted for jokes deemed anti-Semitic. In Greece, another jokester was arrested for insulting a famous monk by making his name sound like a pasta dish. In Italy, comedian Sabina Guzzanti was investigated for joking that “in 20 years, the pope will be where he ought to be — in hell, tormented by great big [gay] devils.”

Read Turley’s op-ed here.